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in Personality Psychology 
JEANNE MARECEK 
Psychologists have set about describing the true nature of 
women with a certainty and a sense of their own infallibility · 
rarely found in the secular world .... Psychology has nothing 
to say about what women really are like, what they need, and 
what they want, essentially because psychology does not 
know: 
-Weisstein (1971, pp. ~.o7, 209) 
Theories of feminine personality were easy targets for the ire of second-
wave feminists inside and outside psychology. Indeed, the history of psy-
chology amply justifies Weissteins scorn. As the first wave of feminism was 
cresting, Grant Allen declared women to be "the sex sacrificed to reproduc-
tive necessities," the "passive transmitters" of the gains in human civiliza-
tion pr~duced by men (1889, p. 258). He summed up the distinction be-
tween the sexes succinctly: "All that is distinctly human is man ... ; all that 
is truly woman ... is merely reproductive" (p. 263). 
Writing at the height of the campaign for women's suffrage, Joseph 
Jastrow (1915) devoted a lengthy section to male-female differences in his 
personality textbook Character and Temperament. In Jastrow's account, 
woman was little more than a uterus surrounded by a supporting personal-
ity. He was persuaded that the "divergent anatomy and physiology of sex" 
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gave rise to a host of male-female dichotomies, including male reason and 
female emotion. 
In contrast to claims about female personality grounded in reproduc-
tive biology, psychoanalysis offered theories based on girls' early experi-
ence. At least in theory, psychoanalysis offered possibilities for multiple de-
velopmental pathways, diverse feminine personalities, and female sexual 
subjectivity. But this multiplicity did not s~rvive in the reworking of psy-
choanalysis in the postwar United States. Representations of feminine per-
sonality in American popular culture during the 1950s enshrined such 
psychoanalytic concepts as penis envy, the weeping womb, and female mas-
ochism. Writers took as inevitable the inferiority of women's character, 
moral fiber, and mental stability. Popular accounts of feminine personality 
were prescriptive as well, insisting that for women, heterosexuality, monog-
amy, marriage, and motherhood were essential conditions for normality, 
maturity, and fulfillment. A runaway best-seller of the era was Modern 
Woman: The Ldst Sex by Ferdinand Lundberg and Marynia Farnham (194 7). 
The authors claimed that wartime participation in paid work had "mascu-
linized" women, reducing them to a "bundle of anxieties" and generating 
an epidemic of neurosis, delinquency, and disordered emotions throughout 
society. 
Sexist claims about female psychology did not go unchallenged. In the 
early 20th century, feminist psychologists such as Helen Thompson Wool-
ley and Leta Stetter Hollingworth spoke out forcefully against what they 
regarded as bogus accounts of female psychology. Woolley, for example, 
assailed psychologists for "flagrant personal bias, logic martyred in the 
cause of supporting a prejudice, unfounded assertions, and even sentimen-
tal rot and drivel" (1910, p. 340). Hollingworth argued against the Darwin-
ian claim that women's genetic makeup made them less likely than men to 
be highly,. creative or intelligent. A pacifist, she also spoke out against the 
nationalistic pronatalism of World War I propaganda. Later on, psychoana-
lytic theories also drew sharp criticism. Karen Horney and Clara Thomp-
son, both revisionist psychoanalysts, argued that it was cultural pressures 
on women that lay behind the feminine personality patterns that their col-
leagues had attributed to the intrapsychic residue of early childhood. These 
pressures included social and economic dependence on men, the suppres-
sion of women's ambition, puritanical restrictions on female sexuality, and 
limited opportunities for self-expression and development (Homey, 1926/ 
1967; Thompson, 1942). Horney (1926/1967) courageously took issue 
with the notion of penis envy, pointing out that the· ideas on the subject put 
forth by male analysts resembled the "naive assumptions" of small boys. In 
Postmodern Feminism in Personality Psychology 5 
doing so, she challenged Freud as well as Karl Abraham, her own analyst 
and teacher. Horney paid a high price for her audacity: she was ostracized 
from the psychoanalytic communities in Berlin and in the United States 
(Garrison, 1981). 
The stirrings of second-wave feminism prompted Daedalus to devote 
an issue to the subject "The Woman in America" in the spring of 1964. Erik 
Erikson's (1964) infamous paper "Inner and Outer Space: Reflections on 
Womanhood" was the lead article. Erikson saw himself as a champion of 
women. In his eyes, his was a positive view of female difference and an anti-
dote to both the negative Freudian view and the wrongheaded claims 
emerging from the nascent women's movement. For Erikson, women's "in-
ner space"-the "somatic design" that destined them to bear offspring-
created a "biological, psychological and ethical commitment" to care for 
human life (1964, p. 586). This inner space was the key to women's identity 
and psychological development, as well as to their happiness. Charging that 
contemporary feminists were "moralistic," "volatile," and "sharp," Erikson 
dismissed calls for, equality of the sexes. In his opinion, the clamor to ex-
pand women's presence in public life was a response to deep-seated anxi-
eties about nuclear annihilation. Such a feminine presence could bring to 
public life ethical restraint, a commitment to peace, devotion to healing, 
and the nurturing values associated with home and family. 1 
Second-wave feminists took issue with all these characterizations of 
women's psychology. By the mid-1970s, several volumes of collected papers 
challenged psychoanalytic claims about personality, psychopathology, and 
psychotherapy (Franks &: Burtle, 1974; Miller, 1973; Strouse, 1974). This 
critical work gained momentum from the broad-based political movement 
behind it. Moreover, a cohort of feminist academics and practitioners stood 
ready to build upon it. At least to some extent, the organized presence of 
feminists staved off the professional isolation and ostracism that earlier 
feminists had endured. Indeed, these second-wave feminists took on the 
task of reforming the practice of psychotherapy and counseling more gen-
erally. They formulated sets of guidelines for curbing sexism in clinical 
practice that were promulgated'by the American Psychological Association 
and by the Division of Counseling Psychology. 
Feminist scholars of the 1970s also made signal conceptual and meth-
odological advances. Anne Constantinople (1973), for example, pointed 
out that standard psychological tests had been constructed with masculin-
ity and femininity as a single, bipolar continuum, making them mutually 
exclusive. Test takers were therefore forced to disavow masculinity in order 
to be categorized as feminine and vice versa. Building on Constantinople's 
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critique, Sandra Bern (1974) devised a measure of masculinity and feminin-
ity (the Bern Sex Role Inventory) that permitted respondents to endorse 
mixtures of masculine and feminine attributes. Feminist researchers en-
deavored to reform knowledge-producing practices in psychology more 
generally. They drew UP, numerous guidelines for eliminating sexist biases 
in the design, execution, and interpretation of studies of male-female dif-
ferences, as well as guidelines for eliminating sexist language. 
The publication of Personality and Psychopathology: Feminist Reap-
praisals (Brown & Ballou, 1992) carried the feminist critical project further, 
with its contributors strutinizing a variety of ~heoretical approaches to per-
sonality and psychopathology. The papers collected in that volume made it 
clear that psychoanalysis was not unique in incorporatihg biases against 
women. (Nor indeed were psychoanalytic theories always and necessarily 
incompatible with feminism.) Moreover, by 1992, diverging points of view 
had emerged within feminist scholarship. Various theories of feminine per-
sonality had both their champions and their opponents, as did various ap-
proaches to therapy, various methods of producing knowledge, and varying 
ideologies of feminism. Feminist personality theory had become-and re-
mains-an arena for vibrant, sometimes fierce, critical interchange and rig-
orous debate. 
POSTMODERNISM AND FEMINIST PSYCHOLOGY 
In this chapter, I describe developments in postmodern psychology and 
critical psychology. These movements offer feminists additional critical 
tools to rethink gender, personality, and psychopathology. Postmodernists 
are skeptical of received truths and taken-for-granted frames of reference. 
In the postmodern view, knowledge is never innocent, but always value-
laden and predicated on specific sociopolitical conditions that it serves to 
legitimize. Postmodern inquiry points up the power of discourse-
utterances, interactions,,and practices-to produce consensual reality and 
a shared arena of public conduct. Discourse both regulates and constitutes 
consciousness. It constitutes what we know to be the body, conscious and 
unconscious mind, and emotional life (Weedon, 1987). The dynamics of 
power in everyday social life are another site of postmodern inquiry. This 
power "from the bottom" is ubiquitous and far-reaching. Indeed, what 
Foucault referred to as "Power/Knowledge" complicates our ideas of free-
dom. Whether or not we are subject to relations' of force ("power from 
above"), we are implicated in the webs of power circulating through lan-
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guage. The critical psychology movement turns its eye on psychology as a 
cultural institution, studying how cultural knowledge flows into psychol-
ogy and how psychological knowledge circulates back through culture, 
shoring up the status quo and legitimating prevailing power structures 
(Fox &: Prilleltensky, 1997). 
For many feminists, postmodernism and critical psychology have been 
important allies. They have provided valuable resources for continuing the 
tradition of critique that originated with first-wave feminists like Helen 
Thompson Woolley. But by and large, in the United States, feminist psy-
chologists have been wary of (and often hostile to) these movements, hurl-
ing brickbats like "jargon mongers," "number-phobics," and "antiscience 
types." The Psychology of Women Quarterly (PWQ), our flagship journal, 
has maintained an offtcial stance that is resolutely opposed to postmodern-
ism. In 1995, the incoming editor set the journal's policy on an exclu-
sionary course: "As a scientific journal, PWQ provides a voice for a side of 
feminist psychology that we want to preserve in this age of P?Stmodern-
ism .... PWQ is a research journal with an empirical, scientific tradition 
that is centered in the discipline of psychology" (Russo, 1995, pp. 1, 2). 
In 2000, the policy statement of the new editor, entitled "PWQ: Fem-
inist Empiricism for the New Millennium," renewed and hardened this 
stance: "Nancy Russo argued rightly that PWQ is the scientific voice in 
feminist psychology. As feminists, the•new Editorial Board remains com-
mitted to the idea that 'PWQ is a research journal with an empirical, sci-
entific tradition that is centered in the discipline of psychology' " (White, 
2000, p. 1). 
How odd that a journal's editors would proudly announce their aim of 
keeping out innovation! How odd-that preserving a single mode of produc-
ing knowledge for a full decade would be elevated to a fe:i,ninist ideal. The 
later editorial policy goes on to invite "diversity" in journal submissions, 
but the examples of diversity it gives are quite staid: "articles with male par-
ticipants, articles using older data bases, and articles using qualitative 
methods" (White, 2000, p. 1). 
The description of PWQ as a journal of "feminist empiricism" suggests 
that its resistance to postmodern psychology stems not only from resistance 
to innovation, but also from an unexamined residue of a timeworn tradi-
tion in psychology. Empiricism is the epistemological stance that all knowl-
edge originates in experience and observation, without the aid of theory or 
received knowledge.2 From early on, American psychology was dominated 
by an empiricist bias toward data gathering to the exclusion of introspec-
tion, theory, and reflection. James McKeen Cattell, who championed 
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experimentalism, connected the production of "hard" data in the laboratory 
to the ideals of masculine "hardness," muscularity, vigor, and physical exer-
tion embodied in the "New Man" movement; in contrast, he viewed reflec-
tion, contemplation, and theory building as passive and therefore associ-
ated with femininity and even effeminacy. It is ironic to find Cattell's sexist 
dichotomy unwittingly echoed by prominent feminist psychologists (e.g., 
Hyde, 1995; Weisstein, 1993). The latter, for example, has dismissed post-
modernism as a "swamp of self-referential passivity" and a "cult of high re-
treat" (Weisstein, 1993, p. 244). 
In short, postmodern ideas have had only limited circulation in U.S. 
feminist psychology, even while they have flowered in women's studies, in 
other social sciences, and in feminist psychology in other national contexts. 
Moreover, these ideas have often been seen through the distorting lens of 
positivism. The editors of this volume, Mary Ballou and Laura Brown, 
asked me to discuss "postpostmodemism," tjiat is, the directions that femi-
nist psychology might take after postmodernity. In pondering their charge, 
I came to believe that we in this country have only scratched the surface of 
what feminist postmodernism can offer to the study of personality and psy-
chopathology. Much of this chapter, therefore, takes up the unfinished busi-
ness of postmodern personality theory. 
FEMINISM, POSTMODERNISM, AND 
PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY: UNFINISHED BUSINESS 
Postmodern psychology has encompassed a broad array of initiatives and 
ideas. I describe those that seem especially fruitful for feminists working in 
personality psychology and psychopathology. 
Interrogating Psychology's Constructs 
Evelyn Fox Keller (1995) has described gender as "a silent organizer of dis-
cursive maps of the social and natural world ... even of those worlds 
women never enter." We can pose two questions about how gender silently 
organizes the discursive map of psychology: 
• How does gender, in concert with other categories of social hierar-
chy, organize the discourse of psychology? 
• How do the resulting psychological constructs serve to distribute 
power and resources unequally across the social landscape? 
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Feminists have shown that many personality constructs have been 
conceptualized in gender-biased ways. They include attachment, passivity, 
aggression, field dependence, codependency, attractiveness, emotion, self-
esteem, autonomy, and humor. Stephanie Shields (1995, 2002) poses some 
questions that a postmodern exploration of emotion might address: How 
and when is emotion explicitly labeled in everyday situations? What does it 
mean to say that someone "got emotional"? What counts and does not 
count as "an emotion" in psychological theory? What kinds of emotional 
displays are associated with low-status groups (e.g., women, men of color, 
and gay men)? How do these-displays impact on perceived authority, credi-
bility, and power? 
Recently feminists and other cultural critics have used the tools of 
postmodern analysis to reconsider the constructs of trauma, stress, and 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). These constructs have been impor-
tant in feminists' struggle for public recognition of the seriousness of gen-
der-linked violence, as well as in practitioners' efforts to develop therapeu-
tic approaches for victims. Critiques of constructs that so~e trauma 
theorists have put forward are not meant to deny the suffering connected to 
traumatic events or to impugn the goodwill.or good intentions of theorists 
or therapists. Indeed, the concern of the critics is that the conceptual appa-
ratus of trauma theory has come to have unforeseen negative consequences 
for sufferers. When gender-linked violence is inserted into the medicalized 
framework of psychiatric diagnosis, the sociopolitical nature of the violence 
is expunged (Kleinman, 1995). Moreover, if diverse instances of violence, 
atrocity, betrayal, and sexual invasion are simply lumped together as "trau-
ma," their psychic meanings, their interpersonal significance, and possibly 
even their moral import are lost to view. Little effort is made to understand 
how the lifeworlds and identities of the sufferer and those around her have 
been altered. Instead, the focus comes to rest on routine procedures of 
symptom removal. That eye movement desensitization and reprocessing 
(EMDR) could be proposed as a treatment both for the survivors of the 
World Trade Center attack and for a young girl repeatedly molested by her 
father seems less a testimony to the efficacy of EMDR than a reminder of 
the narrowed outlook of the medicalized perspective. 
Other prominent meanings associated with psychological trauma con-
cern the status of victims. One meaning is that victims inevitably and uni-
formly suffer lasting, even permanent, psychological damage, a meaning 
that is double-edged (Haaken, 1998; Lamb, 1999). Also, as Dana Becker 
(2000) has persuasively argued, the category PTSD has become part of a 
"caste system of diagnosis and treatment": women with PTSD are "good 
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girls" and women with borderline personality disorder are "bad girls." 
Many feminist therapists have favored the diagnosis of PTSD because, in 
their view, it announces to a woman that "she is normal," that is, she is hav-
ing a "normal" response to an abnormal situation (Marecek, 1999a). How-
ever, PTSD, as part of a medicalized and technocratic diagnostic system, 
represents a further embrace of the medicalization of women's problems, 
not an escape from it. 
I briefly mention two additional constructs that have received recent 
attention in the psychological literature. One is forgiveness, a construct 
promoted heavily by the so-called positive psychology movement. From a 
feminist perspective, we can raise many important questions about the 
meaningfulness and ethics of conceptualizing forgiveness as a state to be in-
culcated by cognitive-behavioral techniques: Can we theorize forgiveness 
apart from specific contexts of harm? Is forgiveness always a moral good? 
Does it always promote the psychological well-being of the forgiver, as its 
proponents claim? Embedding forgiveness in its relational context raises 
further questions: What harm is to be forgiven? What is the relationship be-
tween the injured party and the harm-doer? What was the intent of doing 
harm? Should the harm-doer be asked to acknowledge responsibility; show 
remorse, and make restitution as a condition for being forgiven? We must 
also question why there has been a rush to devise therapies that will incul-
cate forgiveness, but no companion efforts to devise therapies that inculcate 
remorse. To make forgiveness a moral imperative while disregarding the 
moral status of the harm-doer is one-sided at best and ethically repugnant 
at worst. 
Forgiveness is overtly a gender-neutral construct. Yet it is hard to ig-
nore the fact that forgiveness emerged as a research topic promoted by the 
positive psychology movement and as a therapeutic goal in a time of in-
tense public and professional discussion of the sexual abuse of children and 
intimate violence against women. As a construct abstracted from ongoing 
experience, forgiveness appears neutral. This masks the relations of power 
involved in gender-linked violations, forgiving, remorse, and restitution. 
Moreover, laboratory studies of forgiveness in which one stranger inflicts 
trivial harm (e.g., the loss of 25 cents) on another are unlikely to contribute 
meaningful knowledge about social relations. In fact, by further shunting 
aside the complex power dynamics of real life, such studies can only obfus-
cate our understanding. 
Resilience, another emerging construct in mainstream psychology, has 
been extolled by some feminist psychologists. They see it as celebrating 
women's efforts to cope and prevail despite hardship, discrimination, and 
Postmodern Feminism in Personality Psychology 11 
life crises. But resilience has another side. As McKinley (2001) has noted, 
resilience too often refers to "a woman's ability to adapt to risk in a manner 
that is consistent with life trajectories valued by the middle and upper mid-
dle class" (p. 85). Moreover, the search'to identify women and girls who are 
"resilient" can be a quest for heroines who overcome adversity by personal 
effort or inner strength. In this way, the quest to identify the qualities of re-
silient women seems parallel to the search for the personal and familial 
characteristics of "notable" women and "successful" women that occupied 
feminist psychology in the early 1970s. (See, e.g., the inaugural issue of 
Psychology of Women Quarterly [1976] for several examples of this quest.) 
The "Resilient Woman" (or "Girl") can easily be the,other side of the coin 
of what Mary Crawford and I called the "Woman-As-Problem" (Crawford 
&: Marecek, 1989). Like the Woman-As-Problem, the Resilient Woman sti-
fles social critique; her image replaces a focus on social and economic in-
justices with a focus on individual triumph through personal will. More-
over, when resilience is construed as a product of personal effort, it suggests 
that those who do not thrive are responsible for their plight. The slide from 
there to victim blaming seems nearly inevitable. 
Historicizing the Psychology of Personality 
Like volcanic eruptions, debates about the true differences (and similari-
ties) between women and men have boiled up at intervals since the begin-
ning of U.S. psychology. As early as 1910, Helen Thompson Woolley 
warned that the observational design of sex-difference studies made it im-
possible to draw firm conclusions about the origins of such differences. She 
noted that it was impossible to draw comparable samples of men and 
women because the social circumstances of their lives were so different. 
Similar caveats about sex-difference research have been, reiterated repeat-
edly over the subsequent 90-odd years. More recently, research on male-
female difference has also been criticized for its essentialism and false uni-
versalism (Hare-Mustin &: Marecek, 1994). That is, studies assume that 
there are inherent (essential) qualities of womanhood; furthermore, they 
make spurious generalizations about all women based on observations of a 
limited subgroup of women ( usually those who are white, middle class, and 
living in industrialized Western countries). Yet despite these fundamental 
critiques, studies of male-female differences-by feminists, antifeminists, 
and others-continue to be churned out. By 2000, at least 18,700 such 
studies had been published in English-language psychology journals. 
, A postmodern feminist might approach the literature on male-female 
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differences not as a scientific record, but as a historical archive of cultural 
trends in the discipline and in the larger society (Marecek, 1995). What is 
revealed about cultural change and continuity when we observe the trends 
in the record? What are the shifting ideological purposes that have driven 
the research? Over the past 30 years, the focus of psychologists' attention 
has shifted from sex differences in cognitive abilities to sex differences in 
emotional capacities to sex differences in mating and reproductive strate-
gies. Research in the 1970s focused on reevaluating claims of male-female 
difference and associated notions of women's inferior intellectual abilities. 
In the 1980s, the ground shifted to assessments of male-female differences 
in morality, empathy, and care of others, with women touted as superior to 
men. This emphasis on difference took a different and less celebratory tum 
in mass-market psychology, where celebrity gender experts like Deborah 
Tannen, John Gray, and Michael Gurian argued that the sexes were so dif-
ferent that failures of communication, mismatched motives, and incom-
mensurable interests were inevitable. In the 1990s, it was evolutionary 
psychologists who grabbed the microphone (or perhaps we should say 
megaphone). They too claimed universal and profound differences, differ-
ences that served to legitimate and naturalize male privilege, male sexual 
dominance, and even violent predation of women by men. Close analysis of 
these shifts could tell us a great deal about the changing preoccupations, 
anxieties, and vested interests of researchers and funders, as well as the cul-
ture at large. 
Psychologists often presume that the objects of psychological knowl-
edge are fixed and stable, like those of physics and chemistry. But there are 
no brute data of the social world comparable to those of the natural world. 
Instead, the terms by which we understand our social relations and our-
selves fluctuate as the social world changes. The meanings of psychological 
constructs-for example, self-esteem, depression, assertiveness, masculin-
ity, femininity, and premenstrual distress-are local, time-bound, and 
matters of social negotiation. Consider, for example, the cop.struct of asser-
tiveness. Popularized by behavior therapists in the 1960s, assertiveness was 
at that time contrasted with passivity and self-effacement. By the mid~ 
1970s, however, lack of assertiveness had become identified as a "woman'.s 
problem," with an assortment of psychotherapies, training workshops, pro-
fessional development seminars, and self-help books to help women be-
come assertive. As a woman's problem, assertiveness gained an additional 
layer of meaning. Leaming to be assertive was prescribed as an antidote not 
just for passivity but also for aggression. Indeed, a_ best-selling self-help 
book of the time was called How to Be an Assertive (Not Aggressive) Woman 
(Baer, 1976). 
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Another example is premenstrual difficulties. Premenstrual difficulties 
were earlier called premenstrual tension (PMT). PMT was said to involve 
feeling nervous or "keyed up." When premenstrual distress reemerged as 
premenstrual syndrome (PMS) during the 1980s, the central psychological 
feature shifted from tension to irritability, "bitchiness," or rage. Moreover, 
its name change (from "tension" to "syndrome") elevated its severity'and 
presaged its eventual certification as a psychiatric condition. As psychologi-
cal constructs, assertiveness and PMS have several things in common. Both 
shifted in meaning as the second wave of feminism took hold. Both were 
widely discussed in self-help culture. Both identified women's' anger as a 
psychological problem in need of remedy. This latter view was in sharp con-
trast to the views of feminists of the 1970s, for whom anger could be invig-
orating, righteous, and even therapeutic. Seventies feminists (including 
some feminist therapists) hoped to instigate women's anger, not to quell it. 
They saw anger as a spur to take action and to struggle against unfair con-
ditions. 3 Seen against this background, both PMS and assertiveness seem 
like early portents of the backlash against feminism that was to mount over 
the next decade. 
For a postmodern psychologist, examining the history of constructs 
serves as a reminder of their indeterminacy. Our constructs are not faithful 
representations of a reality "out there"; instead, their meanings shift in ac-
cord with meaning shifts in the surrounding culture. Negotiation over the 
status of certain scientific constructs can be contentious. Parlee (1994), for 
example, documents the struggle among feminist social scientists, gynecol-
ogists, and psychiatrists for control over the meanings of premenstrual dis-
tress. Scott (1990) describes a different political struggle-this one involv-
ing Vietnam veterans-over the definition and medicalization of PTSD. 
Rethinking Sex and Gender 
By and large, feminist psychologists have challenged biological explana-
tions for gender difference. Nonetheless, U.S. feminist psychology retains 
strong undercurrents of biological foundationalism, as does U.5. psychol-
ogy and culture. Consider the syllogism that sex is to gender as nature is to 
nurture. That is, sex pertains to what is biological or "natural," gender to 
what is learned or cultural. Rhoda Unger (1979) put forward this formula-
tion in the American Psychologist over 20 years ago. She defined gender as 
"those characteristics and traits socio-culturally considered appropriate to 
males and females." Her formulation was intended to set apart social as-
pects of maleness and femaleness from biological mechanisms, so the for-
mer could be submitted to scientific scrutiny. The sex/gender dichotomy 
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was a significant conceptual advance in its time, but a reformulation of 
both "sex" and "gender" fa her model is now long overdue. 
Unger's conceptualization of gender advanced an individual difference 
model. Feminist theorists have since articulated other meanings of gender. 
Some view gender as a socially prescribed set of relations. Some see gender 
as a complex set of principles-a meaning system-that organizes male-
female relations in a particular social group or culture (Hare-Mustin &: 
Marecek, 1990). Some see gender as social processes by which status, hier-
archy, and social power are distributed. Some conceive gender in terms of 
social practices that produce masculinity and femininity in mundane inter-
actions and in social institutions (Bohan, 1993; West &: Zimmerman, 
1987). T4ese meanings focus on processes and practices, not static traits, 
on relations and social transactions, not private minds. By and large, U.S. 
feminist psychologists have yet to make full use of these alternative mean-
ings of gender. Most remain mired in Unger's view of gender as individual 
difference and as little more than the cultural elaboration of sex. With such 
a view, not only is our sense of gendered possibilities limited, we cannot 
readily theorize the emergent gender categories put forward by transgen-
dered, transsexual, intersexed individuals (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Parlee, 
1998). Nor can we make use of the provocative theoretical resources put 
forward by queer theorists. 
The conception of biological sex in Unger's sex/gender dichotomy is 
also outdated. In that dichotomy, sex stands as some immutable bedrock 
that remains after gender is stripped away. But a large and fascinating body 
of work in critical science studies, social history, cultural studies, anthro-
pology, and feminist critical psychology points out that sex, biology, and 
"the" body are not pretheoretical, ahistorical, and prediscursive "givens" 
(e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Laqueur, 1990). What any cultural group takes 
to be "natural" does not exist outside the realm of interpretation and lan-
guage. Biological "facts" are lodged within webs of assumptions that shift 
from one cultural setting to another and from one epoch to another within 
the same culture. Feminist psychologists who have shaken loose from bio-
logical foundationalism have been able to pursue a variety of questions 
about embodied practices. An early example is Suzanne Kessler and Wendy 
McKenna's Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach (1978). More recent 
examples are the collection edited by Kathy Davis (1997) and Kessler's 
(1998) study of intersexed children. Leonore Tiefer (1995, 2001) has 
mounted powerful and persuasive critiques of the discourse of sexology, in-
cluding the human sexual response cycle, conceptions of sexual dysfunc-
tion, Viagra culture, and, more recently, the emerging diagnostic category 
female sexual dysfunction. 
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Cultural Determinism, the Person, and Psychic Life 
Feminist psychologists have compiled an impressive corpus of empirical 
knowledge about how social contexts structure women's lives and gender 
relations. Slowly but surely, that corpus of information is coming to encom-
pass women and girls from diverse backgrounds and social locations. But 
the emphasis on the power of the social context to shape women's lives of-
ten slides into cultural determinism. In describing the results of empirical 
studies, we slide too easily from statistical generalizations (typically show-
ing modest effects and considerable variability) to overgeneralizations to 
universal claims. Such universal claims imply that extrapersonal forces 
fully determine human action; the person is robbed of any agency whatso-
ever. A streak of cultural determinism also runs through postmodern psy-
chology. Feminists in psychology who "took the discursive turn" empha-
sized the power of language to structure subjective experience. In our 
analyses of the linguistic categories and dominant discourses authorized by 
the culture, those categories often were granted a determining influence 
over psychic life. In short, the slide into cultural determinism has been an 
easy one for psychologists, no matter where they start. 
Why should we bemoa,_n the disappearance of agency from theories in 
feminist psychology? What do we gain from formulating theories of per-
sonality and adult development that go beyond figuring people as automa-
tons responding to social conditioning or hapless victims of gender (as 
phrases like "gender effects" imply)? There are many answers to this ques-
tion. Most of us have a philosophical commitment to view women as 
agents. If our theories and research methods do not make space for psychic 
life, intention, and subjectivity, we cannot examine resistance and agency. 
We need such theoretical space to study how some people rebel, chafe at re-
strictions, and produce change. As feminists, many of us are "socialization 
failures," as Nancy Datan (1989) put it: we were not automatons who ab-
sorbed the cultural dictates of our time. We have made different political 
investments than the norm, we interpret the world in a skewed way, we 
may have chosen to live nonnormative or unconventional lives, and we en-
gage in oppositional politics, speaking unpopular truths as to power. As 
Datan asserted, our theories should enable us to examine and explain our 
own lives. 
The challenge is to devise what Nancy Chodorow (1999) has called 
"both-and" theories. Such theories see people as both constrained by their 
circumstances and "doers," as both socially constituted and causal agents. 
Such theories must offer an account of how people invest in certain identi-
ties and projects, while resisting or rejecting other ones. Such investments 
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are both rational and emotional, both conscious and not conscious. People 
sometimes espouse identities and pursue courses of action that go against 
their self-interest or their conscious desires. Thus far, efforts by psycholo-
gists to theorize agency and resistance have drawn upon versions of 
psychoanalytic theory (see, e.g., Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & 
Walkerdine, 1984/1998) or on the work of the Soviet theorists Vygotsky 
and Bakhtin (1935/1981). Contemporary cultural anthropologists such as 
Catherine Lutz, Sherry Ortner, and Dorothy Holland-all of whom have 
interests in gender-have developed a particular rich set of resources for 
theorizing selves, identities, feelings, agency, and resistance (cf. Holland, 
Lachicotte, Skinner, & Cain, 1998). 
Psychology of Women and History 
Concern with real-life contexts sets feminist work apart from much of 
mainstream psychology. In the mainstream, social context is seen as a 
source of nuisance variance to be eliminated by laboratory controls; college 
students (presumed to be stand-ins for generic human beings) are often the 
population under study. In contrast, the corpus of research in feminist psy-
chology encompasses a range of respondents and acknowledges their par-
ticularity. Feminist psychology has focused on social contexts as sites of in-
justice and domination: school classrooms, peer groups, marriages and 
romantic partnerships, dating relationships, and therapy relationships. By 
and large, however, our concern for context has been confined to such 
microsocial contexts. It is time for us to turn our gaze farther outward, to 
interrogate the larger frameworks of history, society, and culture in which 
personal relations are nested. 
Some feminist psychologists have shown us the way toward linking 
women's lives to larger political, social, and economic structures. Abigail 
Stewart and her students and colleagues, for example, have addressed the 
impact of historical events on the identities and life trajectories of women 
involved in them. These events include the feminist movement, the civil 
rights movement, and World War II (see, e.g., Franz & Stewart, 1994, and 
Romero & Stewart, 1999). Brinton Lykes and her colleagues (e.g., Lykes, 
Brabeck, Ferns, & RadaD:., 1993) have worked with Guatemalan women liv-
ing under conditions of civil upheaval, state-sponsored terrorism, and gue-
rilla warfare. Walkerdine, Lucey, and Melody (2001) have noted the de-
mand for cheap, mobile female labor created by global capitalism: factory 
workers, domestic service workers, sex workers, childcare workers. Walk-
erdine and colleagues' work takes up the ways that schools and other social 
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settings prepare poor and working-class British girls (especially girls of 
color) to become part of this labor pool. 
MORE UNFINISHED BUSINESS: 
CHALLENGING METHODOLOGICAL IMPERATIVES 
Michelle flne has urged feminist psychologists to set aside laboratory stud-
ies, surveys, and interviews. She implores: "Watch me with women friends, 
my son, his father, my niece, or my mother, and you will see what feels 
most authentic to me. These very moments, which construct who I am 
when I am most me, remain remote from psychological studies of individu-
als or even groups" (Fine & Gordon, 1993, p. 16). 
Many feminist psychologists have made a commitment to research that 
addresses women's lived experience. But, as Michelle Fine says, the meth-
odological norms of the discipline keep us from doing so. One such norm is 
the preference for standardized instruments. This preference rests on the 
assumption that there exist universal, fixed attributes that can be assessed 
in a uniform way across locales and social groups. The apparent ease of us-
ing "canned" instruments holds great appeal, especially when the profes-
sional milieu demands high-speed productivity. But such instruments can 
lead to suppression of local variations and "what feels most authentic" 
when their meanings do not square with those of respondents. Drawing on 
his own research in Puerto Rico, Lloyd Rogler (1999) described how items 
on a standardized scale for measuring stress made no sense in the respon-
dents' life situations. A study by Hope Landrine and her colleagues 
(Landrine, Klonoff, & Brown-Collins, 1992) offers a powerful refutation of 
the assumption of uniformity across cultural backgrounds. They asked U.S. 
women from different ethnic groups to rate themselves on a set of items as-
sessing gender-stereotypic traits. Overall, the groups did not differ in their 
ratings. Yet when the women were asked to interpret the response catego-
ries for the items, ethnic differences emerged for several items. The 
researchers argued that effectively, women did not complete the "same" 
questionnaire because the words and phrases carried different meanings 
depending on a woman's ethnidcultural background. Calling for a revision 
in methodology, they noted that "what we take to be the voice of data is the 
voice of the researcher's interpretation of them" (p. 161). 
Another methodological norm that postmodern psychologists have 
criticized is categoricalism. By "categoricalism," I mean the practice of di-
viding people into categories (e.g., white/African American/Latino; hetero-
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sexual/lesbian/bisexual) and searching for the personal traits and attributes 
that distinguish one group from the other. This has been a standard ap-
proach to producing knowledge in psychology, including feminist psychol-
ogy. The following statements, for instance, are taken verbatim from a psy-
chology of women textbook: "Lesbians had significantly higher self-esteem 
than college women:'; "Black women reported a lower level of functioning 
than Black men, White women, and White men." A moment's reflection on 
these statements reveals how porous the boundaries of such categories are. 
"Lesbians" and "college women" are hardly mutually exclusive categories. 
Neither are black and Latina or white and Latina. Moreover, statements like 
these take categories of race/ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, and the like 
as a priori givens. We might better see them as historically specific ideolo-
gies. Instead of regarding gender, class, race/ethnicity, and sexual orienta-
tion as ontological categories, we could investigate them as provisional 
markers of identity and status. Another possibility would be to study class, 
gender, and race as markers that set in motion relations of privilege, power, 
subordination; and rebellion. 
For postmodern psychology, any account of reality-including a scien-
tific account-is a redescription. All accounts are organized within particu-
lar assumptive frameworks and embed certain interests. Alternate accounts 
that represent social reality in other ways are always possible. Psychological' 
constructs such as personality traits and psychiatric diagnoses are accounts 
of reality that have certain features and that embed certain power relations. 
For example, they redescribe social experiences as internal qualities. They 
assume that those experiences (e.g., math anxiety, aggression, or depres-
sion) are similar for everyone and can be measured in the abstract, apart 
from ongoing experience. In the clinical, domain, diagnostic classifications 
have becom~ the dominant way of accounting for suffering. Diagnostic cat-
egories redescribe psychic distress in a particular way. For example, diag-
nostic categories redescribe psychic suffering as a discrete disorder, an "it." 
They reduce distressing experience to a collection of symptoms lodged 
within a person. Eliminating or reducing those symptoms becomes the goal 
of treatment. This redescription is cloaked in the twin mantles of scientific 
objectivity and benevolent medicine. Feminist critics have often asked 
which diagnostic categories are good and which are bad, but they have paid 
less attention to the consequences of the category system per se. 
One alternative to diagnostic categories is to construe psychological 
symptoms as idioms for expressing suffering. Such idioms are culture-
specific, taking forms and conveying meanings that are intelligible to other 
members of the culture. Thus, for example, "ants crawling in the head" is a 
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common idiom of emotional distress in Nigeria, while cold hands is an 
idiom of distress in Cambodia. Idioms of distress can also be thought of as 
relational practices that accomplish certain interpersonal goals. Consider 
recent reports of a dramatic rise in suicides among young women in the 
People's Republic of China. Based on ethnographic work on recent deaths 
and their knowledge of the cultural tradition of protest suicides, Lee and 
Kleinman (2000) have interpreted these self-inflicted deaths as means of 
registering protests against arranged marriages and other obstacles women 
face when they try to improve their social status. 
Studying Subjectivity 
The questions that postmodern psychologists ask call for methods of inves-
tigation that go beyond canonical psychology research methods. Rather 
than measuring people or categorizing them, postmodern psychologists 
prefer to listen to them. Attending to people's own words brings us closer to 
their psychological reality than having them check boxes or circlt numbers. 
The goal of this listening is to retain the rich texture and multiple layers of 
people's experience, not to reduce it to a set of unidimensional codes. 
A number of feminist projects have developed sophisticated strategies 
for analyzing unstructured talk. Some examples include The Male in the 
Head (Holland, Ramazanoglu, Sharpe, & Thomson, 1998), Raising Their 
Voices (Brown, 1998), Flirting with Danger (Phillips, 2000), and Young Mas-
culinities (Frosh, Phoenix, &: Pattman, 2001). But the question of how to 
interpret others' talk brings us face to face with a prior question: Who 
should have authority over interpretation and meaning? This is an ethical 
question as well as an epistemological one. An extreme position would re-
strict the researcher's task to bringing forward the voices of her participants 
without any analysis or interpretation. In this view, any interpretation in-
volves a kind of psychological imperialism: it appropriates participants' 
words for researchers' purposes and imposes researchers' meanings on 
them. Some feminists have experimented with ways of acknowledging dif-
ferent truths, negotiating the different positions of researcher and respon-
dent, and representing conflicting interpretations. For instance, Glenda 
Russell (2000) deliberately constructed an interpretive team with a dispa-
rate mix of members, so that multiple investments and multiple ways of 
seeing would be in play during the process of dat,r analysis. Judith Stacey 
(1990) requested the participants in her study of Silicon Valley families to 
provide a gloss on her ethnography, granting them, as she put it, "the right 
to control its closing words" (p. 273). 
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The discipline of psychology has long held that adequate controls can pre-
vent the social identity of researchers from influencing the research process. 
But philosophers of social science (some influenced by postmodernism, 
some not) have long challenged this notion of knowledge uninfluenced by 
values and personal commitments. Researchers do not have what Donna 
Haraway has called "the god's-eye-view" of the world: objective, disinter-
ested, all-seeing. Our value commitments and social identities inevitably 
influence choices we make regarding the topics we study, as well as our the-
oretical frameworks, research procedures, and interpretations of the data. 
Value-free research is a myth akin to the myth of value-free psychotherapy. 
Critics who challenged the notion of value-free therapy pointed out that 
often therapy seems value-free because it upholds the values prevailing in 
the culture. Fish do not recognize that they are swimming in water. A paral-
lel claim might be made about research: research that appears to be objec-
tive or value-free might appear so only because the pretheoretical assump-
tions hovering·over it are those of the culture and thus remain unseen. 
Rethinking Ethical Responsibilities 
The research approaches that I have been describing demand that we re-
think our ethical responsibilities and move beyond the Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists. The ethical principles of research seem designed with the 
prototypical psychology study in mind: an encounter that takes place in a 
dearly demarcated time and place (e.g., a laboratory session) in which both 
the experimenter's and the participant's everyday identities are bracketed. 
Furthermore, the ethical code pertains in large measure to atomistic indi-
viduals who are regarded as generic "human subjects." What happens when 
data collection is not so clearly delimited? For.example, field data may in-
clude casual remarks passed in everyday conversations or interchanges be-
tween strangers that are accidentally overheard. Moreover, the prescribed 
procedures for assuring confidentiality and anonymity often are not suffi-
cient when we work with respondents' own words and when our studies 
are embedded in a particular place and time, rather than in the ahistorical 
laboratory. 
When we study individuals embedded in particular social groups or 
contexts (neighborhoods, ethnic communities, cultures, or schools), the 
ethical questions compound. The ethical code, however, deals primarily 
with individual respondents: their privacy rights, their physical safety, and 
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their psychological welfare. But what about those who are spoken about, 
such as siblings, spouses, parents, and bosses? Do they have privacy rights? 
Furthermore, should any protections be extended to the groups or commu-
nities that respondents represent? Are these collective entities entitled to 
privacy, consent, or protection from harm (including harm to their reputa-
tions)? Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2001), returning to the site of her field-
work on mental illness in rural Ireland after 25 years, found that her work, 
a classic of anthropology, was regarded as slander and traitorous by the vil-
lagers: "You wrote a book to please yourself at our expense. You ran us 
down, girl. You ran us down" (p. 311). Scheper-Hughes beat a midnight re-
treat out of the village under threat of physical harm. 
Lisa Fontes (1998) has noted that the question "How can researchers 
best understand, interpret, and present findings?" is a question with ethical 
dimensions as well as scientific ones. Many critics (e.g., Crawford &: 
Marecek, 1989) have noted that the person-centered interpretations that 
psychologists typically put forward locate the origins of behavior in the in-
dividual. This places the onus of change on the individual; in some situa-
tions, it is only a short step away froni blaming the victim. Otlier critics, 
like Michelle Fine (1992), remind us that the material and social privileges 
that psychologists as members of the middle class have are not available to 
working and poor people, especially if they are not white. We psychologists 
are prone to underestimate the constraints that such individuals face and 
thus we may wrongly see them as passive, self-defeating, unresourceful, 
and so on. The possibilities for self-efficacy, empowerment, and self-actual-
ization are sharply curtailed in circumstances of injustice, domination, and 
oppression. 
NEW BUSINESS: POSTMODERNISM, 
POSTFEMINISM, AND THE BACKLASH 
A significant and vocal backlash against feminism has emerged in popular 
culture (Faludi, 1991). The term feminism has come to be disparaged, even 
vilified, by the mass media. Legal gains such as affirmative action and 
reproductive rights have eroded; state support for poor women and their 
children has been severely curtailed by the welfare reforms of 1996. The 
backlash against feminism is also palpable in psychology as a discipline and 
a profession. Feminism and other progressive approaches to knowledge 
have been nudged aside in favor of new approaches that are more politically 
conservative. These include an emphasis on the biological bases of behav-
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for, the so-called positive psychology movement, and evolutionary psychol-
ogy. Conservative pressures have mounted for the field of psychology to 
assume a public. profile more agreeable to conservative political leaders, to 
recruit individuals with right-wing values to the discipline, and to tone 
down its social activism (Redding, 2001). Feminist clinicians are faced with 
additional conservative pressures from managed care companies, drug 
companies, and the biologically oriented psychiatric establishment. To-
gether, they compose a broad-based movement that redefines psychological 
difficulties as biological aberrations best controlled by medication. Femi-
nist therapists are not necessarily opposed to medication. However, bio-
medical perspectives can squeeze out attention to social context. Relieving 
symptoms with drugs does not address the more difficult process of making 
necessary changes in one's life situation. 
All feminists face the backlash to some degree. I have been engaged in 
a project involving interviews with feminist therapists (Marecek, 1999a; 
Marecek & Kra~etz, 1998). These practitioners spoke vehemently about 
the antif eminist attitudes they encountered in their work; they had heard 
feminists characterized as angry, man-hating, "ball-busting," abrasive, home-
wreckers. For some, the backlash altered what they could safely say to 
clients and colleagues. We feminists outside clinical settings too find our-
selves making adjustments in our speech and actions in order to survive in 
surroundings that have become inhospitable. 
Neither scientific evidence nor postmodern critique is likely to dis-
mantle the backlash. Nonetheless, postmodernism offers some tools for un-
derstanding the ideology of the backlash. Critical discourse analysis, the 
study of how language figures in social processes, is one such tool. Critical 
discourse analysis aims to uncover the nonobvious ways in which language 
operates in social relations of domination and power and in ideology 
(Fairclough, 2001). One important function it can perform is to alert us to 
the ways in which the terms and forms of the backlash enter into our own 
language practices. 
Let me return to the research on feminist therapists that I described 
earlier to give an example (Marecek, 1999b). In one portion of the research 
interview, respondents briefly narrated their development as feminist thera-
pists. In many of the narratives, anger was a prominent element; redemp-
tion from anger was a recurrent theme. Many therapists described them-
selves as having been too angry when they were younger women or 
inexperienced therapists; at the time of the interview, they remarked that 
their anger had been tempered.4 Here are some exa!Ilples from the inter-
view transcripts: 
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Th. 103: I think in the earlier years of my practice, I was--the anger 
that I had with men and with patriarchy and with institutions that were 
male-dominated would come through more. 
Th. 53: Well, I think I'm pretty typical and part of it is age. And wis-
dom, which comes with age, which is nice. Because you don't have to be 
so angry. 
Th. 225: I'd say 10 or 15 years ago, I was very outspoken. I would 
probably say anything I wanted to say anywhere to anybody. I was proba-
bly very angry with myself and you feel depressed. What I've done now is 
I have more understanding. 
Th. 150: When I was younger, I was more strident [in therapy]. The 
factors that have affected that are experience, living in the world longer. 
[Int.: What specifically made that change? I I wasn't having the same level 
of overflow of my own issues into my work. I matured in the heart sense. 
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These accounts place anger in opposition to maturity, wisdom, reason, 
and understanding. Like the backlash's characterizations of feminists as 
abrasive and ball-busting, the accounts leave little room for the p9ssibility 
that a feminist's anger might be legitimate or reasonable. Accounting for an-
ger as a developmental stage of immaturity (akin perhaps to adolescent re-
bellion) serves to discredit it. Such accounts deflect attention from the le-
gitimate reasons women might have for being angry. We cannot, of course, 
demonstrate a direct connection between the backlash ideology and the 
presence of these themes in feminists' narratives of their own personal de-
velopment. However, the language and meanings circulating in the culture 
furnish the material available for crafting personal accounts and personal 
identities. We feminists may resist and reshape the meanings that the cul-
tural backlash has given to feminism, but we cannot lift ourselves out from 
the culture. 
CONCLUSION 
It would be rash to predict what twists and turns lie ahead for feminism, 
postmodernism, psychology, and possible combinations of them. Nor can I 
predict what twists and turns lie in the future for the strained relation be-
tween mainstream culture and feminism. Yet there are a few predictions 
that are safe to make. What lies ahead will not be a return to the past. Cer-
tain claims of postmodernism have transformed intellectual inquiry in most 
humanities and social science disciplines throughout much of the world. 
The discipline of psychology in the United States is one of the few sites to 
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remain largely ignorant of these transformations (see the essays collected 
by Marecek, in press). The claims of postmodernism seem unlikely to dis-
appear in a swing back to brute realism. Three such claims seem central: 
that there can be no prediscursive knowledge that is free from the values 
and assumptions of its social setting; that knowledge is always situated and 
any knower has access only to partial truth; and that a researchers social 
identity inevitably shapes the research process. Feminism too has had a 
transformative effect on most academic disciplines, though its effect on aca-
demic psychology in the United States has been muted. Feminist psycholo-
gists have argued that social life is gendered in profound ways, as is intel-
lectual life. They have exposed gender-linked power relations, calling 
attention to experiences of violence, intimidation, and abuse of power in 
intimate relations and domestic life. Feminists have set off storms of con-
troversy and embarked on novel forms of social action. Whatever new pos-
sibilities feminist psychologists invent to theorize gender, personality, and 
psychopathology, we must continue our tradition of disrupting the taken-
for-granted, speaking truth to power, and taking leaps into the unknown. 
NOTES 
1. Note how closely Erikson's line of thought parallels that of Jean Baker Miller in 
Toward a New Psychology of Women (1976). Feminists of the s~ties vilified 
Erikson, while Baker Miller's version of women's difference became a touchstone 
for many feminists of the eighties. 
2. Empiricism originally referred to the practice of medicine based purely on ob-
servation; two synonyms are "quackery" and "charlatanism." 
3. For example, a review of a book on women and madness was titled "Now That 
We're Angry, We're No Longer Mad." 
4. Neither a therapist's actual age or the length of time she had been doing therapy 
was related to her use of this developmental narrative. 
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